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Abstract. Data survcyed for the 'Americans Talk Sccurity' projcct prior to the 1988 U .S. electioo 
are used to evaluate tbe impact of domestic and foreign policy attitudcs oo tbe presidcntiaJ vote. 
Both kinds of issucs did have significant effccts on voting bebavior, cootributing to Dukakis' 
dcfeat. lt is demonstrated, howcver, that prior attcmpU to isolate and weigb tbe elcctoral 
inßuences of these two scts of opinions are flawed, be<:ause they ignorc tbeir interrclation and 
their dependence on panisan sympathies. If thesc factors are explicitly takeo into acoount within a 
causal modelling approacb, tbe 1988 presidential vote in the agregate is found to bave bccn mucb 
morc strongly dctermined by domestic concems. Moreover, the assumption of uniform reactioos 
within the electorate to various iuue arcas is proven wrong. WbiJe domesric policies were more 
decisive for the vote of the majority, tberc also was a dcarly idcntifiable substantial minority tbat 
can bc described as a foreign and defenoe issue voting public. 
l.Introducdon 
There is hardly disagreement in the scbolarly community tbat people's atti-
tudes on political issues do have a strong impact on their voting behaviour. 
There also is little disagreement that over the past four decades these influen-
ces on the vote havc become more important, while the impact of partisan 
affiliations has declined (Nie et al., 1976; Asher, 1988). On the other band, 
disagreement stiU is considerable about whicb kinds of issues are most likely to 
have an effect on the vote. In particular, tbere is an on-going debate over tbe 
relative importance of domestic vs. foreign policy issues. The cooventional 
wisdom is that of Almond (1950), whose research showed that most Amer-
icans knew little about foreign policy and devoted most of their attention to 
domestic issues. The reasons most frequently cited for such 'parochialism' are 
that foreign affairs and national security concerns are too complex to be 
understood by the average person, so that 'non-attitudes' would have tobe 
frequent (Converse, 1970; Bishop et al., 1980), and that domestic policies bave 
more obvious and direct implications for people's everyday life, especially 
their material well-being. 
In recent years a 'revisionist' argument has emerged, and it has been 
pursued along two major routes: First, scholars have attempted to demon-
strate that - contrary to the conventional wisdom- many Americans do in fact 
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have some knowledge of foreign affairs, and that their attitudes on these 
matters display a consistent and 'rational' structure ( Hurwitz and Peffley, 
1987a, 1987b; Graham, 1988; Munton, 1988; Shapiro and Page, 1988). 
Second, there have been efforts to prove that such attitudes actually do have 
a significant influence on voting behaviour. Probably the best example of this 
lauer trend of 'revisionism' is an investigation of the 1980 and 1984 U .S. 
presidential elections by Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989). They point to 
the 'anomaly' that presidential candidates usually campaign heavily on foreign 
policy and national security issues. lf voters were really inattentive to these 
matters, this would be an irrational waste of resources. From their analyses 
these authors conclude that the public does indeed respond to the candidates' 
confrontations over foreign affairs: •The candidates are waltzing before a 
reasonably alert audience that appreciates their grace. And, given a choice, 
the public votes for the candidate who waltzes best' (Aldrich, Sullivan and 
Borgida, 1989: 136). 
This anicle will not attempt to prove that either the conventional wisdom or 
the 'revisionists' are wrong. lt proceeds from the assumption tbat attitudes oo 
foreign affairs should have some impact on voting behaviour. Using data for 
the 1988 presidential election, it will demonstrate tbat American voters indeed 
clearly distinguish between candidates in terms of how competent they judge 
them tobe for handling domestic and foreign issues, and by the extent to which 
they agree with their substantive positions. Already at this stage it will becorne 
obvious that George Bush not only beat Michael Dukakis at the polls, but that 
first he beat him on the issues - foreign and domestic - and that this probably 
was a primary reason for his victory. The article then goes an to disagree with 
the 'revisionists', however, over the strength of the independent effects of 
foreign policy attitudes on the vote. To this author's knowledge, the study by 
Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida is the most elaborate attcmpt so far to demon· 
strate such effects for the U.S. lt will be shown that the approach pursued by 
these authors (and by others) is marred by two major flaws. First, it is 
impossible to assess adequately the relative impact of foreign and domestic 
issues on the vote without taking multicollinearity between the two sets of 
attitudes into account. Since these correlations are quite high, the traditional 
multivariate regression approach will be confronted with a causal modelling 
procedure, simultaneously estimating the interrelations between pany identi-
fication, domestic and foreign issue staods, and voting behaviour. Second, the 
assumption of unifonnity of effects is obviously unrealistic. Why should opin-
ions towards these two policy area<; have the same electoral consequences for 
all citizens? lt will be shown that it is more realistic to assume tbe overall 
electorate to consist of different issue publics- for some types of voters foreign 
affairs being more relevant, domestic issues for others. 
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2. Voten' judgements about tbe candidates' competence ud lssue positions 
In order for political issues to have an effect on voting behaviour, voters must 
have attitudes on those issues. lt one follows the cl~ificatioo of issues into 
valence vs. position issues (Butler and Stokes, 1969, eh. 8), voters must, forthe 
first sort of issues, discem differences in the candidates' competence to handle 
them, and for the second sort of issues they have to perceive differences in the 
candidates' stands, they must have opinions of their own, and they must be 
able to evaluate with whom they agree more. Moreover, the substance ofthe 
issues has tobe recognized and has to stimulate some kind of affect on the part 
of voters (Campbell et aJ., 1960: 170). Drawing on social-psycbological re-
search, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989) summarize these conditions by 
stating that attitudes have tobe both 'available' and 'accessible' tobe able to 
exert an influence on the vote. 
The data from the 'Americans Talk Security' project (ATS) that were 
analyzed here for the 1988 presidentiaJ election (sec Appendix 1) show that 
these conditions were clearly met for domestic as weil as foreign policy issues. 
In both ATS-surveys, an average of 80 percent and more of respondents said 
that they saw differences between Bush and Dukakis in their ability to handle 
various issues (Table 1 ). Almost as many perccived differences in the positions 
held by these candidates on a series of foreign policy and national security 
issues, which were particularly strongly targeted due to the focus of the 
ATS-project (Table 2). There are no sharp distinctions between groups of 
items in the extent to which such differences between the candidates' compe-
tence or positions were perceived. This is true for domestic vs. foreign policy 
competence as well as for the various policy positions. Moreover, on these 
latter positions. weil in excess of 90 percent of respondents were able to state 
their own approval or disapproval.1 Our findings thus strongly corroborate 
those of Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989) about the •accessibility' of 
attitudes. Finally, the data also show that perceptions of both types of candi-
date differences increased visibly (by about five percentage points) during the 
final five to six weeks of the campaign (ATS10 was polled in the first week of 
October, ATSll in the two days preceding the election). 
Not only did an overwhelming majority of voters distinguish between the 
candidates on the issues, but they also predominantly declared them tobe very 
or extremely important for their vote. In both surveys respondents were asked 
how important foreign affairs, economic problems, social, and environmental 
issues were 'in helping you to decide wbich candidate to vote for'; in ATSl 1 this 
was also asked for each of the individual items summarized in Table 1 (and 
listed in Appendix 2). Responses to these questions (Table 3 and first column 
of Tab)e 1) demonstrate tbat domestic concems were rated as somewhat more 
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Table J. Judgments about thc oompetc:ncc of Bush and DukalUs on various issues. 
'Please teil me whethcr )'OU fcd Imponana: 'Yo tbat sec diffaencc in ampc:k:ua: 
Bush or Dukakis would do oCthc: 
a bettcr job of haDdling ilsuc G.Busll G.Busb 
thatmuc' (scalc :ziero to more lllOIC 
ooe) ATSlO axnpctc:nt ATSll con.,ctem 
Re1atiom with thc: SoYiet Union 
and anm control issues (5 ~) 0. 71 81.J 68.0 87.3 71.8 
Ocher forc:ign policy (7 items) 0.64 76.5 53.6 82.1 58.9 
Emnomic is&uc:s (6 items) 0.74 82.11 52.2 88.0 56.2 
Social is&uc:s (6 itc:ms) 0.69 79.4 44.l 8S.2 51.1 
Mean forc:ign policy issuc:s 0.67 78.6 lilU 84.3 64.3 
Mean domestic mues 0.71 81.3 48.6 86.4 53.3 
Overallmean 0.69 79.8 ss.o SS.4 58.4 
lmportancc of single issues for the votc: was only askcd in ATSl 1. Individual itt:rM arc: listed in 
appendix 2.1. 
important than foreign issues. with economic problems topping the list. and 
environmental ones at the bottom. Since the averages of all importance scales 
are at or above the score for 'very important' one should not forget, however, 
that respondents were not forced to make choices or produce a rank order. 
They could call everything very or extremely important for tbeir vote. Thus, 
we can only assume that the rank order of the imponance of policy areas 
Table 2. Pcrccptions of different positions of candidatc:s on various iuucs (all figurcs arc: percent-
agc:s ). 
'Please teil mc: whethc:r Rcspondcnt has Different Own position Respo11dc:111s 
you strongly/somewhat own position positions of and pc:roc:ption hokling position 
approw/disapproYe of candidates of caodidatc: asaibc:d to G. 
lhat positioo ... perccivc:d diffc:rences Bush 
Please tcD mc which 
candidatc holds cach ATSIO ATSll ATSIO ATSll ATSlO ATS11 ATSJO ATSll 
position' 
Rc:latiom with SoYiet 
Union and ums oontro1 
is&uc:s (12 items) 95.S 95.4 122 77.1 71.9 75.2 ss.s 57.J 
Othcr forc:ign policy 
is&uc:s ( 4 itc:ms) 93.9 95.0 74.6 81.t 70.8 78.6 49.4 46.2 
Dc:fc:ooc: and armamc:nts 
~(8itcms) 92.0 91.7 79.6 82.4 75.3 78.1 47.7 51.9 
Ü\'Crall mcan 94.4 94.0 74.5 79.6 72.7 76.7 52.7 53.7 
Individual itc:ms arc: listcd in appeodix 2.2. 
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reported here is correct, but that a different question formal would bring out 
the span of relative saliency much more clearly. 
So far we have seen that voters regarded political issues as important for 
their choice, and strongly perceived differem:es between the two candidates -
still increasingly so over the final phase of the campaign. Moreover, they also 
shifted in their evaluations of the two men over the course of these weeks. 
Across all issue areas in Table l, confidence in the ability of George Bush is 
seen as growing, and for Michael Dukakis as declining. In tbe ATSlO survey, 
Dukakis still held tbe edge as far as his ability to cope with social issues was 
concemed; prior to tbe election Bush was leadiog even here, as he did - and 
bad done before - in all other fields. While bis advaotage was only small for 
domestic problems, it was almost overwhelming in the field of foreign policy. 
His final lead in voters' foreign affairs positions was also clear, particularly so 
regarding relations with the Soviet Union and arms control. For questions 
pertaining to defence and armament programmes, Bush went from a minority 
of followers to a majority during these weeks, whereas only Dukakis' positions 
on other foreign policy items became somewbat more popular, and at election 
time still were the majority view. Parallel to this widening lead of Bush on the 
issues, an increase in intentions to vote for him can be observed between tbe 
two points in time (Table A-1, in Appendix 3). The ATS surveys do not 
represent repeated interviewing of the same sample, but independent cro. 
sections. Tberefore, it is impossible to directly ascertain tbat tbose voters who 
switched their issue evaluations were also mainly the ones who changed their 
intended vote. However, tbese parallel trends can bardly be imagined tobe 
accidental. They rather point to a significant impact of attitudes about political 
issues on tbe vote. lt is to this linkage that we now turn in more detail. 
Table 3. Importance of policy ~ for the votc. 
Percentagcs 
Mcan 
Extremely Very Somewbat Noc Not scale 
important important important important IW'C value 
Foreign policy 3.5.6 44.2 15.6 2.4 0.2 0.72 
32.6 4.5.5 16.6 3 . .5 1.8 0.70 
Eronomic issues 39.7 51.2 7.1 1.0 1.0 o.n 
36.9 .52.0 10.0 0.8 0.2 0.75 
Social issues 39.J 4.5.l 13.8 1.4 0.4 0.74 
35.t 51.1 12.1 1.0 0.7 0.74 
Environment 31.8 41.S 20.6 4.1 2.0 0.68 
25.1 46.8 22.3 4.0 1.2 0.65 
Uppcr value is for ATSIO, lower for ATSll. Scale in last column is 0 (for 'not important'), 0.33, 
0.67 and l (for 'cxtremely important'). 
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3. Politkai issues and the 1988 presidential vote 
In order to assess the influence of issues on the vote in the 1980 and 1984 
elections, Adrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989, Table 5) performed regression 
analyses of the presidential vote on pany identification and on a foreign and a 
domestic issue scale. This approach is replicated here as a first step. Individual 
survey questions about political issues from ATSlO and ATSl 1 were combined 
into nine indices, seven for foreign policy and two for domestic attitudes (see 
Appendix 3 and Table A-1). These indices were ( with equal weights) averaged 
into two attitude scales, one for foreign policy and one for domestic opinions. 
The presidential vote intention was then regressed on party identification (for 
the coding of the vote and party identification scales sec Appendix 3) alone 
and on party identification plus the two attitude scales using ordinary least 
squares (Table 4). 
The results show that both party identification and political attitudes bad a 
strong effect on the 1988 presidential vote. In botb surveys party identification 
alone accounts for almost half of the variance in the vote, and the two issue 
scales explain somewhat less than half of the residual variance, so that in total 
between 72 and 73 percent of the variance in voting intentions is accounted for 
by these three predictors. The regression coefficients indicate that attitudes in 
both issue areas bad a significant impact oo the vote, with the weight shifting 
toward domestic issues between the two surveys. ln ATSlO the raw coefficient 
for the foreign scale is )arger than for domestic issues. and the standardized 
effects of both are roughly equal. In ATSll both standardized and unstandar-
dized coefficients are higher for domestic coocems, but a considerable effect 
of foreign policy attitudes is still visible. These results can be interpreted 
Tablr 4. Regression of thc prcsidcntial vote on party idcntification and on domcstic aod forcign 
issucs. 
Party idcntif.:ation 
Domcstic issucs 
Foreign issues 
Constant 
Adjustcd R2 
R2 pany idcntification alooe 
Increase of R2 
lncrease or R2 as fraction of variaoce 
uncxplaincd by party identification 
N 
Values in brackets are standardiud betas. 
c: p< 0.001. 
Al'SIO 
0.21Jc (0.27) 
0.52c (0.34) 
0.77c (0.36) 
0.02 
0.721c 
0.478c 
0.243c 
0.466 
973 
Al'Sll 
0.28c (0.25) 
0. 72c (0.42) 
0.66c (0.28) 
0.06c 
0.726c 
0.48lc 
0.24Sc 
0.472 
988 
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exactly the way Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida analyzed theirs, i.e .• that it has 
been established tbat foreign policy opinions did in 1988 exen a strong inde· 
pendent influence on voting behaviour which is in a similar order of magnitude 
as that of domestic concems - just as bad been the case for the previous two 
elections that these authors investigated. 
This conclusion is not so readily accepted here for the simple reason that 
foreign and domestic attitudes are quite strongly correlated. The correlation 
matrix for the four variables of the regression models of Table 4 (Table 5) 
shows that in the two 1988 surveys the two attitude scales correlated with 0. 72 
and 0.80, respectively. Tbus, the regressions in Table 4 were computed in the 
presence of quite high muJticollinearity between predictors, so that an une-
quivocal separation of effects can hardly have been achieved. If one wants to 
play the devil's advocate, onecan even argue that tbe truecorrelation between 
foreign and domestic attitudes is underestimated in Table 5, because atten-
uation due to measurement error is ignored. Tbis argument is supported by 
factor analyses of the nine indices that bad been combined into the two attitude 
scales. Onhogonal exploratory factor analysis does not extract a domestic and 
a foreign issue factor, but rather one factor on which all competence scales 
load highly, and one for which this is the case for the position scales. 2 This goes 
to show that domestic vs. foreign are not tbe two most distinct dimensions in 
these data. Just the opposite is revealed by a confirmatory factor analysis, in 
which two factors are defined a priori. Only domestic attitude scales are 
allowed to load on the first factor, only foreign scales on the second, and their 
correlation is estimated together with the factor loadings and measurement 
errors. 3 The result is that these two factors correlate at almost 0.95, instead of 
0.8 as found for the two scales computed by averaging over indices. 
If the regression analysis of Table 4 is repeated using these foreign and 
domestic factor scores from confirmatory factor analysis as predictors instead 
of the average scales (Table 6), the difficuJty of decomposing and adequately 
weighing the eff ects of attitudes towards the two policy fields on the vote by 
Table 5. Correlations between pany identification, voting behaviour. and domestic and foreign 
is.~ue judgments. 
Presidential vote Domestic Forcign 
Party identification 0.69 0.61 0.00 
0.69 0.63 0.63 
Prcsidcntial votc o.n 0.77 
0.80 0.77 
Domestic issues 0.72 
0.80 
Uppcr values arc for ATSto, lowcr for ATSll. 
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OLS regression is seen even more clearly. The model into which both factors 
are entered (third column) fits hardly better than the two models containing 
only one of them (first two columns). Thus, it can be claimed with equal 
justification that the joint explanatory power of both factors is almost exclu-
sively due to domestic, or to foreign attitudes alone. Altematively, one could 
say that both the domestic and foreign policy opinions gauged in the ATS-
studies represent one single over-arching attitude dimension that in its effects 
on voting behavior is not clearly differentiated into a foreign vs. a domestic 
component. Estimation of such a model, for which one joint foreign and 
domestic factor was derived from confirmatory factor analysis, actually leads 
to the most parsimonious and best explanation of the presidential vote in terms 
of the variance accounted for (last column of Table 6). 
The implication is that we must not ignore the high correlation between 
domestic and foreign attitudes if we wish to arrive at meaningful conclusions 
about their relative impact on the vote. However, it is not only this correlation 
which mandates an alternative approach, but also the strong association 
between party identification and both sets of attitudes ( the lowest correlation 
for ATSll in Table 5 is 0.63). Classical regression analysis is not the appropri-
ate instrument when the assumption that predictors are uncorrelated is so 
strongly violated, and when there are clear reasons why this should he so, and 
obvious ideas what the causal structure underlying these high correlations 
might be. Party identification shapes both attitudes and the vote, and attitudes 
in different issue areas bang closely together. lt takes a causal modelling 
approach witb simultaneous equation estimation to take this into account. 
Tab/e 6. Regressions of the presidential vote on party idcntification and on domcstic and foreign 
factors (standardized oocfficicnts, ATSll, N = 988). 
Party identification 0.26c 0.27c 0.26c 0.26c 
Foreign factor 0.65c 0.30c 
Dome~tic factor 0.65c 0.37c 
Joint forcign and domestic factor 0.66c 
Constant 0.01 0.05c 0.03a 0.03 
Adjusted R2 0.722c 0.723c 0.726c 0.727c 
R2 party identification alonc 0.478c 0.478c 0.478c 0.478c 
lncrease of R2 0.244c 0.245c 0.248c 0.249c 
lncrcasc of R2 as fraction or 
variance uncxplaincd by party 0.467 0.469 0.475 0.4n 
-: Not entcred. 
a: p< 0.05. 
c: p < 0.001. 
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4. Structural models for tbe influmce of party idendftcation and political laues 
OD the 1988 presidential Yote 
4.1. Comparing structural models and regression models 
For the following analyses only data from ATSI 1 will be used. This survey was 
taken immediately prior to the election, and issue awareness was even higer 
than in ATSIO, so that the most reJiable estimates of issue effects on the vote 
can be expected. Our model here consists of one exogenous concept (i.e., 
party identification) and three endogenous concepts (i.e., domestic and for-
eign policy attitudes and voting behaviour). For domestic and foreign policy 
attitudes there are two and seven observed indicators, respectively (see Table 
A-1); for party identification and the vote there is only one observed indicator 
each, i.e., the theoretical concepts and the observed indicators are identical." 
Causal effects were specified as follows: party identification was assumed to 
have a direct effect on both sets of attitudes and the vote, both sets of attitudes 
were assumed to have a direct impact on the vote, and, finally, domestic 
attitudes were assumed to exert a causal influence on foreign policy attitudes. 
This latter assumption incorporates the multicollinearity between the two sets 
of attitudes into the model. Maximum likelibood estimation of this model ( and 
simultaneously of thc measurement models for domestic and foreign attitudes) 
was performed using the LISREL program.) 
Table 7. Maximum-likelihood models of thc effccts of pany idcntification and domestic and 
forcign issues on the presidential vote (ATSII). 
Full modcl Model without Regression model 
domestic 
--+ forcign 
Dircct cffccts Party -+ domestic 0.60 (24.2) 0.58 (23.2) 
Party -+ foreign 0.08 (3.5) 0.57 (23.S) 
Pany-+ VOIC 0.20 (8.3) 0.15 (4.9) 0.25 (14.9) 
Domcstic - forcign 0.84 (25.8) 
Domestic -+ votc 0.51 (4.5) 0.49 (16.7) 0.46(20.8) 
Forcign -+ vore 0.33 (2.8) 0.45 (14.0) 0.41 (18.0) 
Total cffccts Party-. foreign 0.58 
Party-+ vote 0.69 0.69 
Domcsric-+ vote 0.78 
Chi21dcgrecs of frccdom 315140 1081/41 2100/44 
Adjusted goodncss of fit indcx 0.902 o.ns 0.617 
Root mean squared residual 0.037 0.}50 0.360 
N 988 988 988 
Values in brackets are t-statistics. 
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Estimation results ( first column of Table 7) demonstrate a very good fit of this 
model to the data. They show that in 1988 domestic attitudes had a strong 
impact on foreign policy opinions. People heavily tend to transfer their eval-
uations of a candidate's positions and of bis competence from the domestic to 
the foreign policy field, and their attitudes in both areas are greatly influenced 
by their partisan affiliations. Domestic attitudes are found to have a consid-
erably stronger impact on the vote than foreign policy attitudes, but it should 
be noted that the smaller effect of foreign attitudes still is significantly different 
from zero. The total effect of domestic attitudes on voting behaviour is almost 
two and a half times as strong as that of foreign auitudes, roughly two-thirds 
being direct, and one-third indirect, through foreign policy opinions. 
If this causal effect of domestic on foreign policy attitudes is ignored, the fit 
of the model gets considerably worse. Two versions of such 'wrong' models 
were estimated: one in which this effcct was deleted from the full model (i.e., 
forced tobe zero; second column ofTable 7), and one in which party identifi-
cation and the two sets of issues were treated as exogenous, i.e., the impact of 
party identification on attitudes was also ignored. This is analogous to the 
simple regression model (Table 4 and third column of Table 7). In this 
comparison the regression model performs by far the worst, but simply assum-
ing the impact of domestic on foreign attitudes tobe zero also produces a much 
less satisfactory fit than for the full modeJ. Not surprisingly, however, in both 
'wrong' models the influence of forcign attitudes on voting behaviour is 
estimated as much stronger than in the full model. Thus, it can be demon-
strated that - at least in the 1988 presidential election - political attitudes are 
strongly influenced by party identification, and foreign policy attitudes by 
dornestic oncs. lf the latter eff ect is ignored, tbe impact of foreign attitudes on 
the vote is overestimated. There is no obvious argument why this should have 
been different in earlier elections. lt also deserves mentioning at this point, 
that these results are obtained in spite of the fact that foreign policy attitudes 
were gauged much more extensively in the ATS-studies than domesticones, so 
that the data base is loaded in favor of finding strong effects of foreign issues. 
4.2. Abandoning the assumption of uniform effects 
In the introduction we have argued that earlier research on the relative impact 
of foreign and domestic issues on the vote is incomplete, both because it 
ignored multicollinearity between the two sets of attitudes, and because uni-
form effccts across the whole etectorate were assumed. We now turn to the 
second of these points by estimating the full model from Table 7 for several 
subsamples. The American electorate will be broken down, first, by the 
personal saliency of domestic vs. foreign policy issues, in order to as..~ 
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whether this can lead to the identification of distinct issue publics." Secondly. 
voters are categorized according to their ideology. because this dimension 
played a major role in the 1988 campaign. George Bush distanced himself 
vehemently from liberalism (the 'L-word'). and his campaign used foreign 
policy related arguments a lot more than that of Dukakis. who ratber focussed 
on social and economic issues. This poses the question whether conservative 
and liberal voters indeed do exhibit different propensities to listen to these 
various themes. Finally. a 'mover/stayer' classification will be introduced. This 
will aHow us to investigate the extent to which foreign vs. domestic attitudes 
were responsible for keeping voters loyal to their party. or for making them 
defect to the other party's presidential candidate. 
Our first breakdown is according to self-declared imponance of issue areas 
for individual voting behavior. The mean of the importance of economic and 
social issues was computed, and three groups of respondents were defined 
according to whether they declared foreign issues tobe more or less important 
than these domestic problerns in helping them to decide whom to vote for. or 
whether both bad equal importance scores. Estimation results for these three 
groups are reported in Table 8. 
They show that voters do in fact adequately declare what issues are more or 
less important for their vote. Those who rate the importance of foreign affairs 
as higher (somewhat over one quarter of the sample) are the most unique 
group, while the other two groups are quite similar to each other. Respondents 
in the first group are least influenced in their attitudes by their party identifica-
tion, and they are the only ones with a strong and significant direct effect of 
foreign policy issues on the vote. For them, the direct effect of domestic issues 
on the vote is insignificant, and most of their total effect is indirect. through 
foreign policy attitudes. For all other respondents the influence of foreign 
affairs is either not or only barely significant, and both direct and total effects 
of domestic attitudes on voting are much stronger than for this first group. The 
fit of the model is roughly the sarne for all three subsamples. Even though the 
questions used to define these groups might be less than ideal, our results 
strongly support the reasoning tbat it is unwise to proceed as if all voters were 
equally sensitive to all issues. On the contrary, there is clear evidence for the 
existence of distinct issue publics that differ drastically in the extent to which 
they take various issue areas into account when casting their vote. 
Not only will variations in the electoral impact of political issues be expected 
between diverse issue publics, but also if the electorate is broken down by its 
'ideology', i.e .• into self-defined conservatives. moderates or liberals. The 
prediction bere is to find conservatives being more motivated by their foreign 
policy, and liberals more by their domestic attitudes. As can be seen in Table 9, 
this expectation is almost overwhelmingly confirmed by the data. and the 
distinctions between issue effects are even more drastic than in Table 8. The 
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influence of foreign policy issues on the vote declines monotonously from 
conservatives to liberals, and the impact of domestic attitudes rises monoto-
nously. In fact, foreign policy attitudes only have a significant impact among 
conservative voters. For them, the direct effects of domestic issues are mini-
mal. so that their total effect is almost exclusively indirect. For all other voters 
foreign issues are not significant as predictors of the vote, only domestic 
concerns are. lt should be noted that these two classifications of the electorate. 
by 'ideology' and by importance of issues, covary strongly, but are far from 
identical. 7 Therefore, Table 9 is not simply a repetition of Table 8, but yields 
important additional infonnation: thc American foreign policy issue voting 
public in the 1988 presidential election can best be described as that segment of 
the electorate that defines itself as conservative, while for all otber voters 
evaluations of the candidates on these issues were of little electoral relevance. 
The emphasis in the two candidates' campaigns thus was suitably geared to the 
differential receptiveness across the ideological dimension within thc electo-
rate. 
Our final analysis classifies thc clectorate according to whether or not the 
1988 presidential vote was consonant with respondents' party identification. 
Naturally, the impact of political attitudes on the vote will be expected to be 
lower when party affiliation and the vote are consonant than when they 
diverge. A third group consists of those respondents for whom party affiliation 
and/or voting intention could not bc assessed. R For this group, and for those 
Tab{e S. Maximum·likelihood models cf the cffects of party idcntification and domestic and 
forc:ign issucs on thc prcsidential votc by importance of issue areas (ATSll). 
Direct effects Party - domcstic 
Party- foreign 
Party-+ votc 
Domestic ..... foreign 
Domes1ic-. volc 
Forcign - vote 
Total effects Party -+ foreign 
Pany-.vote 
Domestic ..... votc 
ChFldcgrccs of treedom 
Adjusted goodne~~ of fit index 
Root mean squared residual 
N 
Valucs in bracket.~ arc t·statistics. 
Forcign policy Domcstic and Domesric policy 
morc important forcign cqually more imponant 
important 
0.47 (9.1) 0.62 (15.9) 0.61 (14.5) 
0.07 (1.5) 0.05 (1.6) 0.07 (1.8) 
0.24 (5.4) 0.24 (6.3) 0.11 (2.5) 
0.82 (11.8) 0.90 (18.6) 0.74 (12.3) 
0.2J (1.3) 0.66 (2.0) 0.56 (3.6) 
0.59 (3.3) 0.12 (0.4) 0.37 (2.0) 
0.4.5 060 0.52 
0.62 0.72 0.64 
0.72 o.n 0.83 
102/40 138140 160J40 
0.891 0.897 0.857 
(1 (142 0.037 0.049 
263 382 343 
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with the vote dissonant from party identification, estimating the effects of 
partisan sympatbies on political attitudes and on the vote is neither meaningful 
nor possible: for independents there is no variance in party identification, and 
a deviation of the vote from party identification cannot be explained by party 
identification. Therefore, Table 10 has to contain estimation results for two 
different models, tbe full model for respondents whose party identification 
and presidential vote are in agreement, and a model from which all effects of 
party identification are deleted for the other two groups. 
Not surprisingJy, for 'faithful' voters party identification emerges as by far 
the most important variable for shaping peoples' attitudes and their vote. 
lssues play only a minor role for these respondents' voting decisions: foreign 
policy attitudes do not have a significant impact at all, tbat of domestic 
problems is significant, but far lower in magnitude than in earlier results. 
Stronger issue eff ects are visible for the other two groups of voters, particularly 
for those categorized as 'all other'. Among them, both issue areas exert a 
significant influence on voting intentions, with domestic problems again in the 
lead. 'Unfaithful' voters, finally, were mainly motivated by judgements about 
the competence of the candidates for domestic policies, tbe coefficient for 
foreign policy attitudes being in the correct direction but below statistical 
significance. We thus can conclude that in the 1988 presidential election 
political attitudes were least relevant electorally for those wbo toed the party 
line, and most relevant for voters who defected from their party identification, 
did not have one to start with, or could not decide to vote for either of the 
candidates. 
Tabk 9. Maximum-likclibood models of tbc effccts of pany identification and domestic and 
foreign issues on tbe presidcntial vote by ideology (ATSll). 
Conservatives Moderates Uberals 
Direct effccts Pany -+ domestic 0.47 (10.7) o.ss (13.6) 0.58 (9.4) 
Party -+ foreign 0.07 (1.9) 0.07 (2.2) 0.03 (0.4) 
Pany-+ vote 0.23 (S.S) 0.14 (3.7) 0.29 (4.1) 
Domcstic -+ forcign 0.82 (13.8) 0.87 (17.4) 0.79 (7.0) 
Domcstic -+ votc 0.06 (0.3) 0.65 (2.8) 0.74 (2.8) 
Foreign-+ vote 0.82 (3.4) 0.21 (0.8) - 0.01 (- 0.0) 
Total eUects Party -+ foreign 0.45 0.54 0.49 
Pany-+ vote 0.62 0.61 0.72 
Domestic -+ votc 0.72 0.83 0.74 
Chi21dcgrccs of frecdom 123140 160/40 94140 
Adjusted goodness of fit index 0.902 o.sn 0.825 
Root mean squared residual 0.040 0.049 0.054 
N 360 404 168 
Values in brackets arc t-statistics. 
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Abandoning the assumption of uniform issue effects on the vote across the 
electorate thus yields important and plausible findings. The concept of issue 
publics, that are affected unevenly by attitudes toward distinct policy arenas, 
receives strong empirical support. In the 1988 presidential election the conser-
vative-liberal dimension covaried with the distinction between foreign policy 
vs. domestic policy issue publics, but the two classifications were far from 
being identical. Nevertheless, their foreign policy attitudes were by far more 
relevant for the voting behaviour of conservative than of liberal voters, and 
campaign strategies were set up and refined accordingly. Finally, our third 
breakdown of the electorate shows that foreign policy attitudes - even though 
more important than domestic ones for the vote of a rninority - were not 
decisive for the aggregate election outcome. For loyal voters, defectors from 
their party identification, and independents alike the effects of domestic issues 
on the vote proved to be consistently and considerably stronger than those of 
foreign policy concerns. 
5. Conclusion 
Three major results emerge from the analysis presented here: First, one of the 
primary reasons Michael Dukakis was defeated on election day 1988 is that he 
failed to convince majorities of the American electorate on the issues. The 
topics actualized during the campaign were strongly on people's minds, but in 
Tab/~ 10. Maximum-likelihood modcb of thc cffects of pany identificalion and domestic and 
forcign issucs on thc prcsidcntial vote by party ideolification and voting bchaviour {ATSl 1). 
Party IO and Pany ID and All othcr 
vote consonant vote dissonant respoodcnts 
Dircct cffccts Party -+ domestic 0.79 (34.2) 
Party - foreign 0.12 (2.6) 
Party -+ votc 0.73 (33.1) 
Domcstic -+ forcign (l_78 (14.3) 0.61 (7.1) 0.77 (16.9) 
Domcstic--... vote 0.22 (3.5) 0.37 (3.1) 0.46 (S.S) 
Foreign --... votc 0.08 (1.2) 0.14 (1.2) 0.24 (2.9) 
Total effects Party ..... forc:ign 0.73 
Pany-+ vote 0.96 
Domcstic -. vote 0.28 0.46 0.65 
Chi2/dc:grcc:!\ of freedom 246140 122135 270/35 
Adjusted goodneß of fit indcx 0.893 0.657 0.596 
Root mean squared residual O.o35 0.152 0.146 
N 705 R6 197 
Values in brackets arc t-statistics. 
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most fields majorities agreed more with Bush than with Dukakis, and regard-
ed the former as more competent to deal with the nation's problems. During 
the final weeks of the campaign Dukakis could not close tbe gap, but feil even 
further behind. Second, these findings hold true both for foreign and domestic 
issues. Attitudes toward both policy areas bad a significant impact on the vote. 
However, it could be demonstrated that previous attempts to separate tbeir 
effects, which ignore their interrelation, are incomplete. If the notion that 
attitudes in different issue areas will normally not be independent from each 
other, and tbat they all to a considerable extent will reflect partisan sympa-
thies, is explicitJy incorporated into the model, it becomes obvious that for the 
electorate in general tbe 1988 presidential vote was more heavily inftuenced by 
domestic than by foreign policy concerns. · 
Third, finally, the •anomaly' pointed out by Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 
that presidentiaJ candidates so strongly campaign on foreign issues, even 
though allegedly they are irrelevant for voters, has largely evaporated. Their 
assertion was that in some recent elections these issues bave bad about equaJ 
weight as domestic ones for the electorate. We have shown tbat their method-
ology is inadequate to support such a claim, and that, with a more adequate 
approach, the importance of domestic problems for the electorate in total is 
greater than that of foreign issues. But even theo there is no anomaly. If the 
judges in the eJectoral dance contest rak.e both the grace in the waltz and rock'n 
roll style into account, it makes sense for competitors to rock and roll their 
breath away, especially if their waltzing perfonnance is not that outstanding. 
Moreover, some judges might give more weight to the waltz, others to the 
rock'n roll. For the 1988 presideotial election we could indeed demonstrate 
that the electorate consists of different types of judges, a majority whose 
voting behaviour is much more strongly due to domestic concerns, and a 
minority who responds more beavily to foreign issues. Jo tbis election those 
voters ideotifying thcmselves as conservatives were particularly likely to be-
long to this latter category (maybe becawe 'their' natural candidate appeared 
as stronger on foreign policy problems). The final sentences of the Aldrich, 
Sullivan and Borgida article thus sbould be refonnulated: the candidates are 
dancing before a reasonably alert but differenliated audience, parts of which 
pay more attcntion to and are more affected in their judgments by their 
waltzing, others their rock'n rolling. lt therefore makes abundant sense for 
rational candidates to try to exhibit proficiency and style in both disciplines. 
These results for the 1988 U .S. presidential election have important implica-
tions and pose relevant questions for further study, for comparative analysis, 
and for theoretical reasooing about the electoral effects of political issues. 
They can be addressed onJy very briefly and specuJatively. As to further study 
of the U.S. case, it would be interesting to see whether these findings can be 
replicated for earlier elections, and will hold up in the future. Moreover, the 
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foreign and domestic issue voting publics still need tobe defined more precise-
Jy in terms of their social and political characteristics. In a longitudinal per-
spective, the individual stability of belonging to these issue publics should be 
investigated, as should be the underlying causes why voters wind up paying 
more attention to specific sets of policy problems tban to others. 
Another exciting task would be comparative replication, especially for 
nations of Western Europe. Given appropriate data, we can probably expect 
to detect distinct issue publics there as weil, but it is rather doubtful that the 
foreign policy issue public will, like in the U.S., be found tobe concentrated 
among the conservative segment of the electorate. After ten years of peace 
protest and activism, and the conscrvative response to it, it is more likely that 
the attention to foreign and security policy issues across the left-right dimen-
sion (that roughly corresponds to tbe conservative-liberal continuum in the 
U.S.) will rather tend to follow a U-shaped distribution. On the otber band, 
the conclusion that domestic policies were more important in deciding the 1988 
U.S. presidential election than foreign ones can be expected to meet with 
much similar evidence from most Western European countries. Campaigns 
there also by no means do neglect foreign policy - for the same reasons cited 
here for resolving this alleged anomaly, i.e., even if only a minority of voters 
can be mobilized by foreign issues, it would be irrational not to cater to tbeir 
needs, especially if the election is close. But like in the U.S. the saliency of 
domestic issues is usually greater for majorities, and the cases where foreign 
policy concems figure so prominently that they detennine the total outcome 
will be expected to be the exception rather than the rule. 
In tenns of the feedback between theory and empirical analysis, the argu-
ments presented and the results obtained here also transcend the U.S. case. 
The debate between conventional wisdom and 'revisionists' has its European 
counterpart as weil. lt often appears in the form of disagreement over the 
thesis of a 'democratization' offoreign and security affairs. Theoretical analy-
sis can inspire empirical investigation, but sometirnes theoretical debates, 
hopefully, can leam from and be modified by empirical findings. The lesson to 
be leamed here is that both the conventional wisdom and the revisionist school 
can be part right. Yes, there is a majority for whose voting foreign policy 
attitudes are less important tban other concems, but, yes, there also is a 
minority for whose voting the reverse holds. The theoretical and empirical task 
for (national or cornparative) studies of issue voting thus cannot be to establish 
that aJI is black or all is white. The task rather is to investigate which portions of 
the clectorate are 'black', whicb are 'white', whicb are all shades of gray, how 
this comes about, and wbat consequences flow from this assortment of hues for 
the overall distribution of political choices. 
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Notes 
1. This high levcl of issue 'accessibility' could to some extent bc due to the emcrgmce of response 
sets, as in the ATS-studies long batteries of questions were used withio telepbone surveys. See, 
e.g., Frey (1983) and Lavnkas (1987) forthemethodologyandproblemsoftelepboneswveys. 
2. Again there is the possibility that this structure of the data is exaggerated by response selS. 
Judgments about thc candidatc:s' competcncc and posifiOl15 werc gaugcd in two separate 
batteries of questioos. Even though the individual items within these batteries wcrc rotated, the 
respective staning points were not coded in the data sets, so that it is impossible to investigate 
this possibility cmpirically. 
3. Tbc PC-version (6.12) o( the LISREL program was used for all confinnatory factor analyscs 
and maximum likelihood cstimations rcported in this artide. 
4. In LISREL this means that the loading of the obscrvcd indicator on the tbcoretical COocq>l is 
constrained at a value of 1.0, wbich is not modificd during estimatioo of other paramctcrs. 
5. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1984) is tbe authoritative program manual for version 6; its most reccnt 
edition is Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989). For othcr introductioos to LISREL sec, e.g .• Long 
(1983). Hayduk (1987). Due to lirnitations of spacc ooly dircct effects of exogcnous variableson 
endogenous ones (gamma·matrix in USREL-tcrminology), interrclations among endogenous 
concepts (bcta-matrix), and total effects (if different from direct effects) will bc rcported in 
subsequent tables together with goodness of fit statistics. 
6. For an exposition of the concept of 'issue publics' in thc framcwork of clectoral rcsearcb see 
Maggiotto and Picreson (1978). 
7. 'Onty• 32 percent of the conservativcs. e.g., said that foreign affairs were more imponant for 
their votc choicc than domestic issues, while 5-0 percent of liberals declared domcstic problcms 
as morc important. 
8. Almost 85 percent of these rcspondents wcre truc independents. 
Appendices 
Apptrulix J: TM Americans Talk &curtty .studia 
The Amcricans Talk Sccurity (ATS) project was Cunded privately. From October 1987 to Dccem-
ber 1988 twelve tclephonc surveys werc hcld with natioo-wide random samplcs of about 1000 
registcrcd voters each. On the avcrage. interviews lasted 30 to 40 minutcs, and wete strongfy 
focused on Coreign policy and national sec:urity issues. In studies no. 10 and 11 (ficldwork from 
September 30 to Octobcr 3 and November 6 to 7. 1988, respectively) rcspondents wen: also askcd 
for their 1984 and 1988 pt"CSidcntial votc. The Daniel Yantelovich Group did the fieldwork for 
both of tbcse surveys. ATS data sets can be purchascd from the Roper Center of the Univcrsity of 
Connccticut at Stom. In 1990 ATS resumed its polling. Rcportli can bc obtaincd from: Americans 
Talk Security, 83 Church Street, Suite 17, Wmchester. MA 01890, U.S.A. 
Appendix 2: List of domntic an4 fordgn policy itmu 
2.1. JudgerMfl/S aboUI the romptlhu:e of Bush atuJ DuluJkis 
Table 1 summarius responscs to the fol.lowing individual items: 
'Plcase teil mc whethcr you fecl Bush or Dukakis would do a bettcr job of handting this issue ... ' 
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Relations with the Soviel Union and arms control: 
Handling rclation." with thc USSR 
Ncgotiating anns control 
Maintaining strong de(ence 
Guarding against Soviet aggressioo 
Keeping us out of war 
Othcr foreign policy issues: 
Dealing with Central Amcrica 
Solving the cooOict in Middle East 
Dealing with international tcrrorism 
Dealing with international drug tradc 
Standing up to nations that practicc unfair Irade against thc U .S. 
Persuading allies to pay for more of their own dcfcru:e 
U.S. policies toward Soutb Africa' 
Ecooomic issucs: 
Handling ecooomic issues like inßation and unemployment 
Eliminating waste and OYcrspending in thc defencc budgct 
Making thc U.S. more competitive in thc world cconomy 
Dealing with the budget deficit* 
Handling military spending 
Holding down taxes 
Social issues: 
Handling homclcssness and poverty• 
Handling cducation and health carc 
Dealing with crimc 
Requiring the pledge of allegiancc to be said in all classrooms• 
Elirninating unfaimess like racial discrimination • 
Protectiog our natural cnvironment 
Enswing that federal officials do not violatc thc law 
Requiring the death pcnalty for crimes involving murder 
2.2. Perceptions of different poJilioru of IM condida1n 
Table 2 summarizcs responses to thc following individual items: 
'Please tell mc whether you strongly/somewhat approvcldisapprove of that positioo ... P1ease teD 
me which candidate holds each position'. 
Relations with the Sovict Union and arms control: 
Negotiatc with the USSR to cut nuclcar arscnals in half 
Cooperatc with the USSR in joint economic vcoturcs 
Scck to make progrcss with thc USSR. but proceed cautiously 
Ncgotiatc with the USSR to 'freczc' nudcar wc:apoos 
Eliminatc chemical and biological weapons 
Ncgotiatc with the USSR to climinate all nuclear wcapoos 
Scck pcace by maintaining high lcvel of military strength 
Quick.ly end the oold war with the USSR · 
Negotiatc with thc USSR to reduce thcir convcotiooal forccs 
Negotiatc with thc USSR to stop tcstiog nuclear wcapoos 
Modcmize U.S. nuclcar arsenal before considering a •treeze•• 
No economic assistancc to USSR • • 
Othcr foreign policy issues: 
Rcfusc to supply military hardwarc for freeing U .S. bostagcs• 
Givc as much attention to U .S. economic as military strength 
Rcncw and increasc contra aid• 
Refuse to negotiale with international terrorists•• 
Defence and armameots issues: 
Limit research on SDI 
Develop and produce all new weapons thc military waots 
Build up conventional forces to make up for cuts in U .S. nuclear wcapons 
Do not build two airaaft c:arricrs requested by Navy• 
Oppose mobile MX and Midgctman missiles• 
Implement full scale SDI 
Be selective on developing new weapons 
Spend morc on military operatioos (Cuel, ammunition etc.)* 
•: Not asked in ATSlO 
••:Not asked in ATSll 
Appendix 3: lmkx co1111ructio11 
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Presidenlilll 1101e. RespondcnlS who were certain they were going to vote for Bush (Dukakis) wcre 
coded as 1 (- l); respondeots who intended to vote for Bush (Dukakis) but wcrc kss tban certain 
about their vote or whelher they wcrc gojng 10 votc at all, were coded as 0.5 ( - 0.5). All other 
respondents wcrc c:oded with a valuc of zero. 
Party identificadon. Republicans (Demoetats) were coded as 1 (-1). independer>ts leaning 
towards the Repubticans (Democrats) were coded as 0.5 (- O.S). All othcrs were coded as zero. 
Indices for compeience /udgemena. From the four groups ol items in appendix 2.1. indiccs wcrc 
computed as follows: First, respondcnts who dcdared Bush (Dultakis) more cornpetent rea:ivcd 
values of 1 (- 1) on the individual items; all others werc coded zcro. These scales were then 
multiplied with the importance of the individual items ror the voting decision, i.e .• four-point 
scaies from zero (for 'not imponant') to one (for 'enremely important'). Finally, averagcs for thc 
four groups of itcms wcre computed. In addition, a fifth compctencc scale for national security 
could be computed. Respondcnts wcrc asked whether Bush aod Dukakis, if elccted presidcnt, 
would strengthen or weaken U.S. national sec:urity or kecp it about the same. Both thcsc 
questions were combincd into a scale from - 1 to 1. Mtb respondents holding the most favorable 
judgment about Bush and tbe most negative about Dukakis coded at the positive extreme, and 
vice versa. 
Indices for agrttmmt with candidale posiliOfU. From thc thrce groups of items in appeodix 2.2. 
indices werc computed as follows: Respondents who stroogly agreed with a position ascribed to 
Du..'ih (or strongly disagrecd with a posirion ascribed to Duka.kis) were given values of 1 on thc 
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individual items, 0.5 in casc of weak agrecment (disagrcement). Similarly, strong or wealr. 
agreement with a position attributed to Dukakis (or disagrcemenc with Bush) werc coded as - 1 
or - 0.5. respcctivcly. All othcr rcspondents were codcd zcro. rmally. avcrages for tbe thrcc 
groups of items were computed. In addition. in ATS 11 an index for positions towards SOi could be 
computed. Thrce queslions were a.~kcd, one for gcneral endorsc:ment ur rejection of thc program. 
and two for its budget. Respondents with the consistently most favorable attitudes were coded at 
thc positive extreme of a scale from - 1 to 1, respondents with thc CODSistently most oeµtive 
opinions werc coded at thc negative extreme. 
Means of the vote and party iden1ificat10n variables and of these ninc indiccs are rcported in 
Table A-1 for both ATS-studies. Tbe variables describcd in this table are lhc basis for all maximum 
likelihood estimations with LISREL (Tablcs 6 through 10). For the regression modcls (Tables 4 
and 5). the two domcstic and scven (six for ATSIO) forcign policy indiccs werc avcraged, 
respectively. 
Table A-1. Averages of indices. 
Prcsidcntial votc 
Party identification 
Competcnce for economic i~-sues 
Compctcncc for soc:ial is.~ucs 
Competence for relations with USSR and arms control 
Competence for national security 
Competencc for othcr foreign policy issues 
Position on rclations with USSR and anns control 
Position on olhcr forcign policy issucs 
Position on dcfcn.~ and armamcnts issuc~ 
Position on SDI 
-: Not askcd. 
Mea11 
ATSIO ATSll 
0.04 0.12a 
-0.02 0.01 
0.01 0.08b 
-0.10 -0.02b 
0.22 0.22 
0.16 0.18 
0.08 0.07 
0.08 0.10 
-0.07 -0.05 
-0.04 O.O'lh 
-0.11 
All scale" havc a minimum of - 1 and maximum of + l. Diffcrenccs of mean.<i from ATSIO to 
ATSI 1 are not significant. except: 
a: p< 0.05. 
b: p< 0.01. 
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